经合组织公司治理准则翻译模板(中英文第2部分)

日期:2018-01-13 / 人气: / 来源:http://www.rzfanyi.com/ 作者:译声翻译公司

经合组织公司治理准则模板(中英文第2部分)

经合组织公司治理准则翻译模板(中英文第2部分)

  IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance利益相关者的角色

  The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.

  公司治理结构将认可法律和互相协商赋予利益相关者的权利,并且鼓励企业和利益相关者在创造财富、工作机会和持续推动企业财务健康等方面积极合作。

  A. The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are to be respected.

  B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violations of their rights.

  C. Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop.

  D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis.

  E. Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board and their rights should not be compromised for doing this.

  F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor rights.

  (1)通过法律和互相协议赋予利益相关者的权利受到尊重。

  (2)利益相关者的利益受到法律的保护,在他们的权利受到损害时应当获得有效补偿的机会。

  (3)提高员工参与程度的机制应当被允许发展。

  (4)在公司治理过程中利益相关者参与的地方,在及时和有规则的基础上,他们应该有渠道获得恰当的、充分的、可靠的信息。

  (5)利益相关者,包括个别员工和他们的代表,应该能够自由地交换他们关于对董事会违法和不道德行为的看法,在做这些时他们的权利不应受到损害。

  (6)公司治理结构应当被一个有效的破产机制和债权实施机制所补充。

  V. Disclosure and Transparency信息披露和透明度

  The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company.

  公司治理结构应该保证公司所有重大事件及时地、准确地得到披露,包括财务状况、业绩、所有权和公司治理的情况。

  A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on:

  1. The financial and operating results of the company.

  2. Company objectives.

  3. Major share ownership and voting rights.

  4. Remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives, and information about board members, including their qualifications, the selection process, other company directorships and whether they are regarded as independent by the board.

  5. Related party transactions.

  6. Foreseeable risk factors.

  7. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders.

  8. Governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented.

  B. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure.

  C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified, auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in all material respects.

  D. External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to the company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit.

  E. Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users.

  F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective approach that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis or advice by analysts, brokers, rating agencies and others, that is relevant to decisions by investors, free from material conflicts of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice.

  (1)披露将包括、但不限制于以下重要信息:

  i. 公司财务和业绩状况;

  ii. 公司经营目标;

  iii. 主要股权和投票权;

  iv. 对董事会成员和关键经营人员的薪酬政策,和董事会成员的信息,包括他们的资格、选择程序、在其他公司兼任董事情况以及他们是否被董事会确认为独立董事;

  v. 关联交易;

  vi. 可预期的风险因素;

  vii. 关于员工和其他利益相关者的问题。

  viii. 治理结构和政策,包括公司治理规范或政策的详细内容,以及它们实施的程序。

  (2)信息应该按照高质量的会计、财务和非财务公告的标准制作和披露。

  (3)年度审计报告应当由独立的、有能力的、有资格的审计师制作,以便给董事会和股东提供一个外部的客观的保证,财务报告应在尊重事实的基础上公正地描绘公司的财务状况和业绩。

  (4)外部审计师应对股东负责,并对公司负有义务,在审计中具备专业审慎的素养。

  (5)信息传播的途径应确保信息使用者能够平等、及时、便捷地获取信息。

  (6)公司治理结构应当被一个有效的方法所补充,这就是提供和推广分析报告、或者由分析员、经纪人、评估中介等提供建议。由于这些分析报告和建议关系到投资者的决策,因此在其中不应该出现有损于其公正性的重大利益冲突。

  VII. The Responsible of the Board董事会的责任

  The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.

  A. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders.

  B. Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, the board should treat all shareholders fairly.

  C. The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account the interests of stakeholders.

  D. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including:

  1. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures.

  2. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company’s governance practices and making change as needed.

  3. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning.

  4. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders.

  5. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process.

  6. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board members and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions.

  7. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.

  8. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications.

  E. The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on corporate affairs.

  1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, and board remuneration.

  2. When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board.

  3. Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities.

  F. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, relevant and timely information.

  公司治理结构应确保董事会对公司的战略指导和对经营管理层的有效监督,同时确保董事会对公司和股东的责任和忠诚。

  (1)董事会成员的行为应当建立在一个充分可靠信息的基础上,忠实诚信、勤勉尽责、根据公司和股东的最大利益履行职责。

  (2)如果董事会的决策可能对不同的股东团体产生不同影响,董事会应该平等地对待所有股东。

  (3)董事会应该具有很高的伦理标准。它应当充分考虑到利益相关者的利益。

  (4)董事会应该履行以下一些关键职能:

  i. 审查和指导制定公司战略、重要的行动计划、风险对策、年度预算和商业计划、制定绩效目标、监督目标的执行和企业绩效的实现、监督重要的资金支出、收购和出售等行为。

  ii. 监控公司的治理实践成效,在需要的时候加以方向上的干预。

  iii. 选择、确定报酬、监控关键的经营主管人员,在必要的时候、更换关键的经营主管人员;监督更替计划。

  iv. 协调关键经营主管人员和董事会的薪酬,使之与公司和股东长期利益保持一致。

  v. 保证董事会的选聘和任命过程的正规化、透明性。

  vi. 监管经营层、董事会成员和股东之间的潜在的利益冲突,这包括公司财产的滥用和关联交易中的舞弊行为

  vii.确保公司的会计、财务(包括独立的审计)报告的真实性,确保恰当的控制系统到位,特别是风险管理系统、财务和运作控制,确保按照法律和相关标准执行。

  viii督信息披露和对外沟通的过程。

  (5)董事会对公司事务,应该能够行使客观独立的判断。

  i. 董事会应该考虑指派足够数量的、有能力的非执行董事,对潜在的利益冲突的事项行使客观独立判断的任务。这些关键的责任例子是确保财务和非财务报告的完整性、审核关联交易、任命董事会成员、确定关键经营主管人员和董事会的报酬等。

  ii. 当董事会专业委员会设立时,他们的任命、构成和工作程序应该定义明确并由董事会公告。

  iii.董事会成员应该承诺有效地履行他们的职责。

  (6)为了履行他们的职责,董事会成员应该有渠道掌握准确的、关键、及时的信息。

  Part Two nnotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

  第二部分:OECD公司治理准则注解

  I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework

  有效的公司治理结构所要确保的基础

  The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.

  To ensure an effective corporate governance framework, it is necessary that an appropriate and effective legal, regulatory and institutional foundation is established upon which all market participants can rely in establishing their private contractual relations. This corporate governance framework typically comprises elements of legislation, regulation, self-regulatory arrangements, voluntary commitments and business practices that are the result of a country’s specific circumstances, history and tradition. The desirable mix between legislation, regulation, self-regulation, voluntary standards, etc. in area will therefore vary from country to country. As new experiences accrue and business circumstances change, the content and structure of this framework might need to be adjusted.

  公司治理结构将促进市场的透明化和高效率,并对法律的规范,以及监管权、制定规则权和执行权各自责任的明确界定之间进行协调。

  一个有效的公司治理结构所要确保的必要条件是:所有市场参与者在建立他们私人的契约关系时都是可信赖的,适当和有效的法律、规章和制度都构筑于这个基础之上。一个典型的公司治理结构包括法律的基本原理、规章制度、自律机制、主动的承诺,以及由一个国家特殊的环境、历史和传统形成的商业习惯。这些法律、规章、自律、自发的标准等等,它们之间理想化的融合,在这个领域里将因不同的国家产生不同的变化。当新的经验的积累增长和商业环境的变化迁移,这个结构的内容和构造就可能需要被调整。

  Countries seeking to implement the Principles should monitor their corporate governance framework, including regulatory and listing requirements and business practices, with the objective of maintaining and strengthening its contribution to market integrity and economic performance. As part of this, it is important to take into account the interactions and complementarity between different elements of the corporate governance framework and its overall ability to promote ethical, responsible and transparent corporate governance practices. Such analysis should be viewed as an important tool in the process of developing an effective corporate governance framework. To this end, effective and continuous consultation with the public is an essential element that is widely regarded as good practice. Moreover, in developing a corporate governance framework in each jurisdiction, national legislators and regulators should duly consider the need for, and the results from, effective international dialogue and cooperation. If these conditions are met, the governance system is more likely to avoid over-regulation, support the exercise of entrepreneurship and limit the risks of damaging conflicts of interest in both the private sector and in public institutions.

  寻求履行本准则的国家,应当带着以下的目标来监控他们的公司治理结构,包括规章、上市条件及商业习惯等,这目标就是保持和巩固它对市场诚信及经济效能的贡献。作为其中的一部分,考虑到不同的公司治理结构的基本原则和它对于促进公司治理实践的道德伦理、责任感和透明性的全面作用之间的相互作用和补充,这是十分重要的。在形成一个有效的公司治理结构中,这样的分析应当被看作是一个重要的工具。最后,有效的和持续的公开协商成为一个基本的要素、被广泛地认可为良好的做法。此外,在各个地方形成的公司治理结构,国家的立法者和监管者应该充分地考虑到国际对话与合作的需要和结果。如果遇到这些情形,治理系统就可能避免过度管制、支持企业家能力的运用和减少公共机构和私人部门利益冲突损害的风险。

  A. The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view to its impact on overall economic performance, market integrity and the incentives it creates for market participants and the performance of transparent and efficient markets.

  The corporate form of organisation of economic activity is a powerful force for growth. The regulatory and legal environment within which corporations operate is therefore of key importance to overall economic outcomes. Policy makers have a responsibility to put in place a framework that is flexible enough to meet the needs of corporations operating in widely different circumstances, facilitating their development of new opportunities to create value and to determine the most efficient deployment of resources. To achieve this goal, policy makers should remain focused on ultimate economic outcomes and when considering policy options, they will need to undertake an analysis of the impact on key variables that affect the functioning of markets, such as incentive structures, the efficiency of self-regulatory systems and dealing with systemic conflicts of interest. Transparent and efficient markets serve to discipline market participants and to promote accountability.

  公司治理结构将随着这样一个观念而发展:它的影响波及整个经济的成效和市场的完善,促进市场参与者提高市场的透明度和效率。

  作为经济行为的组织形式的公司,它是增长的一个强大推动力。因此,企业运作的内部规章和法律环境是全部经济成果的重要关键。政策制定者有责任把一个结构置于适当的位置,这个结构必须灵活得足以应对广泛的不同环境的企业运作的需要,推动它们发展新的机会去创造价值并确定最有效地使用资源。要达到这些目标,政策制定者应该充分关注经济的最终成果,并且在考虑政策的选择时,他们将需要对影响市场机能的关键的可变量进行效果分析,比如激励结构、自律系统的效率和系统利益冲突的交易。透明有效的市场有利于锻炼市场参与者并提升责任性。

  B. The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance practices in a jurisdiction should be consistent with the rule of law, transparent and enforceable.

  If new laws and regulations are needed, such as to deal with clear cases of market imperfections, they should be designed in a way that makes them possible to implement and enforce in an efficient and even handed manner covering all parties. Consultation by government and other regulatory authorities with corporations, their representative organisations and other stakeholders, is an effective way of doing this. Mechanisms should also be established for parties to protect their rights. In order to avoid over-regulation, unenforceable laws, and unintended consequences that may impede or distort business dynamics, policy measures should be designed with a view to their overall costs and benefits. Such assessments should take into account the need for effective enforcement, including the ability of authorities to deter dishonest behaviour and to impose effective sanctions for violations.

  Corporate governance objectives are also formulated in voluntary codes and standards that do not have the status of law or regulation. While such codes play an important rule in improving corporate governance arrangements, they might leave shareholders and other stakeholders with uncertainty concerning their status and implementation. When codes and principles are used as a national standard or as an explicit substitute for legal or regulatory provisions, market credibility requires that their status in terms of coverage, implementation, compliance and sanctions is clearly specified.

  在一定的范围内影响到公司治理结构实践的法律和规章要求,应当在法律规定、透明度、可操作性上协调一致。

  如果新的法律和规章是必需的,比如对于明显不完整市场的案例,它们应该被设计成一个针对所有的团体的有效的强制执行的方式,甚至是高压手段。向政府和其他企业监管机构、它们的组织代表和其他利益相关者请教,是做这事的一个有效方法。也应该建立保护不同团体权力的机制。为了避免超越规则的不能执行的法律和可能妨碍、扭曲市场动力的无意结果,政策措施应该带着针对全部成本和收益的观念来设计。对于有效的强制,这样的估计应该考虑是必需的,包括阻止不诚实的行为和对于违反者采用有效的处罚等等的权威能力。

  公司治理的目标也被自愿的规范和不带有法律规章性质的标准来阐明。当这样的规范在改善公司治理安排中扮演一个重要角色时,它们可能使得股东和其他利益相关者对于它们的身份地位和执行产生怀疑。 当规范和准则被用作一个国家性的标准、或如一个法律规章条款的明确的替代品时,诸如细则范围的法律地位、执行、遵守和处罚等有关市场信誉的要求应该被明确指定说明。

  C. The division of responsibilities among different authorities in a jurisdiction should be clearly articulated and ensure that the public interest is served.

  Corporate governance requirements and practices are typically influenced by an array of legal domains, such as company law, securities regulation, accounting and auditing standards, insolvency law, contract law, labour law and tax law. Under these circumstances, there is a risk that the variety of legal influences may cause unintentional overlaps and even conflicts, which may frustrate the ability to pursue key corporate governance objectives. It is important that policy-makers are aware of this risk and take measures to limit it. Effective enforcement also requires that the allocation of responsibilities for supervision, implementation and enforcement among different authorities is clearly defined so that the competencies of complementary bodies and agencies are respected and used most effectively. Overlapping and perhaps contradictory regulations between national jurisdictions is also an issue that should be monitored so that no regulatory vacuum is allowed to develop (i.e. issues slipping through in which no authority has explicit responsibility) and to minimize the cost of compliance with multiple systems by corporations.

  When regulatory responsibilities or oversight are delegated to non-public bodies, it is desirable to explicitly assess why, and under what circumstances, such delegation is desirable. It is also essential that the governance structure of any such delegated institution be transparent and encompass the public interest.

  在一定范围内划分不同职权的责任,应该是明确无误的、并确保公众利益的实现。

  公司治理的要求和实践,受到一系列法律的明显影响,这包括公司法、证券规章、会计和审计标准、破产法、合同法、劳工法、以及税法等。在这样的环境下,法律变化的影响可能招致无意识的重叠、甚至是冲突,这样的风险可能阻碍对于公司治理的关键目标的推进。政策制定者意识到这样的风险和采取措施去防止它,这将是非常重要的。有效的执行需要在不同的部门中划分监控、实施和执行的责任,而这种划分必须是被清楚地定义的,这样才能使得有相互补充资格的机关和机构得到尊重并提供更高的效率。在国家的法规权限之间,重叠和可能矛盾的规章也是一个应该被关注的问题,这样才没有规章的真空被利用(例如在没有权限赋予明确的责任中造成的疏漏问题),以及对多重系统服从的成本被忽视。

  当制定规则的责任和监督被授权给不公开的主体时,它需要明确地评估为什么、以及在什么环境下这样的授权是适当的?对于所有这样透明的被授权机构和包含公共利益的治理结构来说,这也是最基本的。

  D. Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the authority, integrity and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and objective manner. Moreover, their rulings should be timely, transparent and fully explained.

  Regulatory responsibilities should be vested with bodies that can pursue their functions without conflicts of interest and that are subject to judicial review. As the number of public companies, corporate events and the volume of disclosures increase, the resources of supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities may come under strain. As a result, in order to follow developments, they will have a significant demand for fully qualified staff to provide effective oversight and investigative capacity which will need to be appropriately funded. The ability to attract staff on competitive terms will enhance the quality and independence of supervision and enforcement.

  监管的、制定规则的、实施操作的职权,应当具有各自的权威、完整性和资源,以便用专业化和客观的方式来完成他们各自的职责。而且它们之间的划分应该是及时的、透明的和有充分说明的。

  制定规则的责任应当被授予那些能够不带利益冲突地行使他们职能、服从公正判断的主体。对于越来越多的公众公司、企业实践和披露增长的数量来讲,监管、制定规则和执行部门的资源可能变得紧张。结果就是,为了跟上发展,他们将需要完全有资格的员工提供有效的监控,并为这些员工提供适当的调查研究地位。这种把员工吸引到竞争关系上来的能力将增强监督和执行的质量与独立性。

  II. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions股东的权利和所有权作用的关键

  The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights.

  Equity investors have certain property rights. For example, an equity share in a publicly traded company can be bought, sold, or transferred. An equity share also entitles the investor to participate in the profits of the corporation, with liability limited to the amount of the investment. In addition, ownership of an equity share provides a right to information about the corporation and a right to influence the corporation, primarily by participation in general shareholder meetings and by voting.

  As a practical matter, however, the corporation cannot be managed by shareholder referendum. The shareholding body is made up of individuals and institutions whose interests, goals, investment horizons and capabilities vary. Moreover, the corporation’s management must be able to take business decisions rapidly. In light of these realities and the complexity of managing the corporation’s affairs in fast moving and ever changing markets, shareholders are not expected to assume responsibility for managing corporate activities. The responsibility for corporate strategy and operations is typically placed in the hands of the board and a management team that is selected, motivated and, when necessary, replaced by the board.

  Shareholders’ rights to influence to the corporation centre on certain fundamental issues, such as the election of board members, or other means of influencing the composition of the board, amendments to the company’s organic documents, approval of extraordinary transactions, and other basic issues as specified in company law and internal company statutes. This Section can be seen as a statement of the most basic rights of shareholders, which are recognized by law in virtually all OECD countries. Additional rights such as the approval or election of auditors, direct nomination of board members, the ability to pledge shares, the approval of distributions of profits, etc., can be found in various jurisdictions.

  公司治理结构应当保护和促进股东权利的行使

  股权投资者具有当然的所有者权利。比如,在一个公众公司的一股股票可以被买进、卖出或转让。一股股票也赋予投资者根据投资数量的有限责任而能够参与企业的利润分享。另外,一个股份的所有权提供了对于企业的知情权和对企业的影响权,而首先是参加股东大会和投票的权力。

  在现实中,企业无论如何不可能由股东投票来管理。股东是由利益、目标、投资水平和能力不同的个人和机构组成的。而企业的管理必须能够迅速地作出经营决定。有鉴于在迅速变动和转换的市场中公司事务的复杂性和现实性,股东不可能期望承担起管理企业行为的责任。企业战略和运作的责任明显地落在董事会和一个由董事会选择、推动、在必要时由董事会替换的管理团队身上。

  股东影响公司的权力集中在一些基本的问题上,比如选择董事会成员、或其他影响公司董事会组成的方法、修改公司的组织文件、批准特别的交易,以及其他基本的问题如说明公司的规章和内部条律。这些部分可以看成是大多数股东基本权利的一个描述,事实上在所有OECD成员国家这些都是被法律所承认的。另外像选择和批准审计师、直接任命董事会成员、抵押股份的能力、批准利润分配方案等的权力,在不同的权限内也能够被确立。

  A. Basic shareholder rights should include the right to: 1) secure methods of ownership registration; 2) convey or transfer shares; 3) obtain relevant and material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; 4) participate and vote in general shareholder meetings; 5) elect and remove members of the board; and 6) share in the profits of the corporations.

  基本的股东权利应该包括以下几个方面:①所有权注册的安全方法;②转让和交易股票;③及时、定期地从企业得到相关和真实的信息资料;④参加股东大会和参与投票表决;⑤选举和撤换董事会成员;⑥分享企业利润。

  B. Shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: 1) amendments to the statutes, or articles of incorporation or similar governing documents of the company; 2) the authorization of additional shares; and 3) extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company.

  The ability of companies to form partnerships and related companies and to transfer operational assets, cash flow rights and other rights and obligations to them is important for business flexibility and for delegating accountability in complex organisations. It also allows a company to divest itself of operational assets and to become only a holding company. However, without appropriate checks and balances such possibilities may also be abused.

  股东应该具有参与权、充分告知权、有关企业重大改变的决策权。这些重大改变包括:①修改法规、公司章程、其他类似的公司管理文件;②授权增发股份;③特别交易,包括转让全部或大部分资产、而这将造成公司被出售的结果。

  公司组建合伙公司和关联公司、转让运作资产的能力,在联合机构内,对于经营的灵活性和委托的责任性来讲,现金流动权和其他权利及责任对它们来讲是很重要的。它也允许一个公司摆脱运营资产并变成一个控股公司,可是如果没有适当的检查和平衡,这种权力也可能会被滥用。

  C. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in genera shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures, that govern general shareholder meetings:

  1. Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely information concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well as full and timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the meeting.

  2. Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the board, including questions relating to the annual external audit, to place items on the agenda of general meetings, and to propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations.

  股东应具备有效的参与机会、能够在股东大会上投票、应当被告知投票规则包括投票程序,这将决定股东大会的正常举行。

  i. 股东应当及时收到关于股东大会举行的日期、地点、议程等充分的信息,也包括关于会议决定的事项的充分及时的信息。

  ii. 股东应当有机会对董事会提出问题,包括对于年度审计报告、在股东大会议程中增加项目、对提议的决议案、对于适当的限制条件等问题。

  In order to encourage shareholder participate in general meetings, some companies have improved the ability of shareholders to place items on the agenda by simplifying the process of filing amendments and resolutions. Improvements have also been made in order to make it easier for shareholders to submit questions in advance of the general meeting and to obtain replies from management and board members. Shareholders should also be able to ask questions relating to the external audit report. Companies are justified in assuring that abuses of such opportunities do not occur. It is reasonable, for example, to require that in order for shareholder resolutions to be placed on the agenda, they need to be supported by shareholders holding a specified market value or percentage of shares or voting rights. This threshold should be determined taking into account the degree of ownership concentration, in order to ensure that minority shareholders are not effectively prevented from putting any items on the agenda. Shareholder resolutions that are approved and fall within the competence of the shareholders’ meeting should be addressed by the board.

  为了在股东大会上鼓励股东参与,一些公司用文件修正案和决议案的简单程序增进了股东在议程中提出条款的能力。改进也使得股东在股东大会前提出疑问并得到经营管理层和董事会成员的回复变得更容易。股东也应该能够对外部的审计报告提出质询。公司可以对保证不出现权力滥用的可能为自己辩解。如果对股东在议程中提出的决议,他们要求股东持有一个指定的市场价值、或股份比例、或投票权的支持,这将是合理的。

  这个最低限度取决于所有权的集中程度,这个程度能保证小股东在议程中提出任何条款不被有效地阻止。已批准的、在股东大会能力范围内的股东决议案应当交由董事会处理。

  3. Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions, such as the nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated. Shareholders should be able to make their views known on the remuneration policy for board members and key executives. The equity component of compensation schemes for board members and employees should be subject to shareholder approval.

  To elect the members of the board is a basic shareholder right. For the election process to be effective, shareholders should be able to participate in the nomination of board members and vote on individual nominees or on different lists of them. To this end, shareholders have access in a number of countries to the company’s proxy materials which are sent to shareholders, although sometimes subject to conditions to prevent abuse. With respect to nomination of candidates, boards in many companies have established nomination committees to ensure proper compliance with established nomination procedures and to facilitate and coordinate the search for a balanced and qualified board. It is increasingly regarded as good practice in many countries for independent board members to have a key role on this committee. To further improve the selection process, the Principles also call for full disclosure of the experience and background of candidates for the board and the nomination process, which will allow an informed assessment of the abilities and suitability of each candidate.

  在公司治理决策的关键点上,例如选举和任命董事会成员,有效的股东参与应该被推进。在董事会成员和关键经理人员的薪酬政策上,股东应该能够使得他们的观点被大家知道。对董事会成员和员工的报酬安排的公正程度应当是股东核准的前提。

  选举董事会成员是股东的基本权利之一。为了选举程序的有效性,股东应该能够参与董事会成员的提名过程,对于个别被提名者或不同的其他提名者进行投票。尽管有时候以防止滥用为先决条件,但最终,在许多国家股东具有获得公司发送给股东的委托代理材料的权力。说到候选人提名,许多国家的董事会已经设立了提名委员会以保证正确地遵守确定的提名程序,以便协调寻找到一个和谐与合格的董事会。在这个委员会里,独立董事具有关键的作用,这在许多国家里日益被关注。选择过程的进一步改进,本准则也要求为董事会和提名程序详尽披露候选人的经历和背景,这将为每一个候选人提供一个能力和适宜性的有信息内容的评估。

  The Principles call for the disclosure of remuneration policy by the board. In particular, it is important for shareholders to know the specific link between remuneration and company performance when they assess the capability of the board and the qualities they should seek in nominees for the board. Although board and executive contracts are not an appropriate subject for approval by the general meeting of shareholders, there should be a means by which they can express their views. Several countries have introduced an advisory vote which conveys the strength and tone of shareholder sentiment to the board without endangering employment contracts. In the case of equity-based schemes, their potential to dilute shareholders’ capital and to powerfully determine managerial incentives means that they should be approved by shareholders, either for individuals or for the policy of the scheme as a whole. In an increasing number of jurisdictions, any material changes to existing schemes must also be approved.

  本准则要求公开董事会的薪酬政策。特别是,让股东了解公司业绩和薪酬之间关系的细节是很重要的,当他们评估董事会的能力和品质时,他们应该为董事会寻找候选人。董事会和经营层的契约由股东大会批准并不十分适当,但使得股东能够把他们的观点表达出来却是不错的方法。一些国家引进了选举顾问,他在不危及雇用合同的前提下将表达股东情绪的声音和力量转达给董事会。在公平基准方案中,对于不是为个人就是为全体的政策安排,董事会的潜在地位稀释了股东的资本力量、并有强有力地决定了经营管理层的激励手段,而这些手段原本是应该由股东所批准的。在权限范围逐渐增长中,对现有安排的任何重大改变也必须得到批准。

  4. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal effect should be given to votes whether cast in person or in absentia.

  The Principles recommend that voting by proxy be generally accepted. Indeed, it is important to the promotion and protection of shareholder rights that investors can place reliance upon directed proxy voting. The corporate governance framework should ensure that proxies are voted in accordance with the direction of the proxy holder and that disclosure is provided in relation to how undirected proxies will be voted. In those jurisdictions where companies are allowed to obtain proxies, it is important to disclose how the Chairperson of the meeting (as the usual recipient of shareholder proxies obtained by the company) will exercise the voting rights attaching to undirected proxies. Where proxies are held by the board or management for company pension funds and for employee stock ownership plans, the directions for voting should be disclosed.

  The objective of facilitating shareholder participation suggests that companies consider favourably the enlarged use of information technology in voting, including secure electronic voting in absentia.

  股东可以亲自投票、也可以缺席投票,两者都赋予投票结果以同等效力。

  本准则推荐一般公认的代理投票。对于促进和保护股东权利来说,投资者能够信赖定向代理投票确实是重要的。公司治理结构应当保证,代理人的投票与被代理人的意向一致、并保证对如何进行非定向代理投票做出公开的规定。在准许获得代理的这些公司权限内,披露会议主席(如通常获得公司股东代理委托的接收者)将如何实行附加的非直接代理投票权,这将是十分重要的。由公司董事会或经营管理层所掌握的公司养老基金和员工持股计划的代理权,其投票意向应该被披露。

  促进股东参与的目标建议公司考虑在投票中如何更有利扩大信息技术的使用,包括在缺席时采用的安全电子投票。

  D. Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership should be disclosed.

  Some capital structures allow a shareholder to exercise a degree of control over the corporation disproportionate to the shareholders’ equity ownership in the company. Pyramid structures, cross shareholdings and shares with limited or multiple voting rights can be used to diminish the capability of non-controlling shareholders to influence corporate policy.

  In addition to ownership relations, other devices can affect control over the corporation. Shareholder agreements are a common means for groups of shareholders, who individually may hold relatively small shares of total equity, to act in concert so as to constitute an effective majority, or at least the largest single block of shareholders. Shareholder agreements usually give those participating in the agreements preferential rights to purchase shares if provisions that require those accepting the agreement not to sell their shares for a specified time. Shareholder agreements can cover issues such as how the board or the Chairman will be selected. The agreements can also oblige those in the agreements to vote as a block. Some countries have found it necessary to closely monitor such agreements and to limit their duration.

  Voting caps limit the number of votes that a shareholder may cast, regardless of the number of shares the shareholder may actually possess. Voting caps therefore redistribute control and may affect the incentives for shareholder participation in shareholder meeting.

  Given the capacity of these mechanisms to redistribute the influence of shareholder on company policy, shareholders can reasonably expect that all such capital structures and arrangements be disclosed.

  使某些股东获得与他们所有权不成比例的控制地位的资本结构和安排,应当被披露。

  有些资本结构允许一个股东行使超过在公司的所有权比例的控制权。金字塔结构、交叉持股、限制性股份或加倍投票权等等,都能够用来减小非控股股东影响公司政策的能力。

  除所有权关系外,其他策略也能够影响对公司的控制权。股东协议是股东团体常用的手段,个别股东可能只持有总股数中很少的股份,但一致的行动会组成一个有效的多数、甚至在最后成为一个最大的单一团体股东。股东协议通常给与他们的参与者以协议的优先权,以便在协议的其他参与者想要出售他们的股份时,可以优先购买这些股份。这些协议也可以包括这样的条款,要求这些接受协议的人为了一个指定的时段而暂时不出售他们的股份。股东协议能够涵盖如何选择董事会和董事长这样的问题。协议也能够要求参与者集体投票。一些国家已经建立一些机制,以便在必要时精确地监控这些协议并限制它们的持续时间。

  投票上限限制了股东投票的数量,而不管股东可能在实际上持有股份数量的多少。投票上限因而重新分配了对公司的控制权,并可能会影响股东参与股东大会的意愿。

  由于这些机制具有重新分配股东影响公司政策的能力,股东有理由期望所有这些资本结构和安排的信息被披露。

  E. Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent manner.

  1. The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in the capital markets, and extraordinary transactions such as mergers, and sales of substantial portions of corporate assets, should be clearly articulated and disclosed so that investors understand their rights and recourse. Transactions should occur at transparent prices and under fair conditions that protect the rights of all shareholders according to their class.

  2. Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management and the board from accountability.

  In some countries, companies employ anti-take-over devices. However, both investors and stock exchanges have expressed concern over the possibility that widespread use of anti-take-over devices may be a serious impediment to the functioning of the market for corporate control. In some instances, take-over defences can simply be devices to shield the management or board from shareholder monitoring. In implementing any anti-takeover devices and in dealing with take-over proposals, the fiduciary duty of the board to shareholders and the company must remain paramount.

  公司控制权市场应被允许以有效率和高透明的方式运作。

  i. 用来规范在资本市场上获得公司控制权和非常规交易,如购并、公司主要资产的出售等的规则和程序,应该明确制定和披露,以便投资者理解他们的权利和追索权。交易应该在透明的价格和公平的条件下进行,以便所有股东依照他们的类别保护他们的权利。

  ii. 反购并机制不应用于使经营层和董事会免受监督。

  在一些国家,有公司采用反购并机制。然而,投资者和证券交易所都认为这些反购并机制被超越公司能力地使用,有可能对公司控制权市场的功能产生严重影响。在一些案例中,防御购并的机制甚至使得经营管理层或董事会逃避了股东的监督。在执行了任何反购并机制、以及在带有购并建议的交易中,董事会对于股东和公司的受托人责任必须放在第一位。

  F. The exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders, including institutional investors, should be facilitated.

  As investors may pursue different investment objectives, the Principles do not advocate any particular investment strategy and do not seek to prescribe the optimal degree of investor activism. Nevertheless, in considering the costs and benefits of exercising their ownership rights, many investors are likely to conclude that positive financial returns and growth can be obtained by undertaking a reasonable amount of analysis and by using their rights.

  所有股东、包括机构投资者,行使自己的所有权应当变得更容易。

  正如投资者可以追求不同的投资目标,本准则并不推荐任何特定的投资策略,也不企图开出最佳投资行为的处方。然而,考虑到行使所有权的成本和收益,许多投资者喜欢得出这样的结论:正面的财务回报和增长能够被合理的数量分析承诺和使用他们的权力来获得。

  1. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their overall corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their investments, including the procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their voting rights.

  It is increasingly common for shares to be held by institutional investors. The effectiveness and credibility of the entire corporate governance system and company oversight will, therefore, to a large extent depend on institutional investors that can make informed use of their shareholder rights and effectively exercise their ownership functions in companies in which they invest. While this principle does not require institutional investors to vote their shares, it calls for disclosure of how they exercise their ownership rights with due consideration to cost effectiveness. For institutions acting in a fiduciary capacity, such as pension funds, collective investment schemes and some activities of insurance companies, the right to vote can be considered part of the value of the investment being undertaken on behalf of their clients. Failure to exercise the ownership rights could result in a loss to the investor who should therefore be made aware of the policy to be followed by the institutional investors.

  机构投资者在受托人的地位上的行为,应该公开他们涉及投资的全部公司治理和投票的策略,包括决定使用他们投票权的适当程序。

  机构投资者持有股份日益普遍。全部公司治理系统和公司监管的有效性和可靠性将因此更多依靠机构投资者,他们能够得到对于他们股东权益更有用的信息、更有效地在他们投资的公司里行使他们的所有权职能。虽然本准则不对机构投资者用他们的股份投票有要求,但它要求披露他们出于什么样的成本效益的正当考虑来行使他们的所有权。对于在一个受托人地位的机构行为,譬如个人养老基金、集体的投资安排和一些保险公司行为,投票权可能被投资所承担的客户利益价值部分考量过。错误地行使所有权可能导致投资者的损失,但他们应该因此而弄明白他们跟从的是机构投资者的什么样的政策。

  In some countries, the demand for disclosure of corporate governance policies to the market is quite detailed and includes requirements for explicit strategies regarding the circumstances in which the institution will intervene in a company; the approach they will use for such intervention; and how they will assess the effectiveness of the strategy. In several countries institutional investors are either required to disclose their actual voting records or it is regarded as good practice and implemented on an “apply or explain” basis. Disclosure is either to their clients (only with respect to the securities of each client) or, in the case of investment advisors to registered investment companies, to the market, which is a less costly procedure. A complementary approach to participation in shareholders’ meetings is to establish a continuing dialogue with portfolio companies. Such a dialogue between institutional investors and companies should be encouraged, especially by lifting unnecessary regulatory barriers, although it is incumbent on the company to treat all investors equally and not to divulge information to the institutional investors which is not at the same time made available to the market. The additional information provided by a company would normally therefore include general background information about the markets in which the company is operating and further elaboration of information already available to the market.

  When fiduciary institutional investors have developed and disclosed a corporate governance policy, effective implementation requires that they also set aside the appropriate human and financial resources to pursue this policy in a way that their beneficiaries and portfolio companies can expect.

  在一些国家,对机构介入一个公司,公司治理政策对市场的公开性要求是相当细致的,包括涉及环境的外在策略要求:他们用于介入的方法、它们如何评估策略的效果等。在某些国家,机构投资者不是被要求公开它真实的投票记录、就是按照良好的实践来期望、在“应用或说明性”的基础上来执行。公开化或者针对他们的客户(只有对每一个客户证券的重视)、或者针对市场(在投资顾问申请注册投资公司的案例中),那将简化昂贵的手续和程序。在股东大会上一个补充的参与方式是建立一个与证券公司持续对话的机制。尽管对于公司公平地对待所有的投资者、以及不对机构投资者泄漏可用于市场的信息是其职责所在,但这种在机构投资者和公司之间的对话还是应该被提倡,特别是规章的障碍被提高到不必要的程度时。因此由公司提供的附加信息通常包括:常规的背景、关于公司正在运作和将来的经营远景等市场信息,这些信息已经在市场上发生作用了。

  当作为受托人的机构投资者已经揭示和披露公司治理政策时,有效的执行就需要他们留出适当的人选和财物资源、按照他们的收益人和资产组合公司的期望的方式来推动这个政策。

  2. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of key ownership rights regarding their investments.

  The incentives for intermediary owners to vote their shares and exercise key ownership functions may, under certain circumstances, differ from those of direct owners. Such differences may sometimes be commercially sound but may also arise from conflicts of interest which are particularly acute when the fiduciary institution is a subsidiary or an affiliate of another financial institution, and especially an integrated financial group. When such conflicts arise from material business relationships, for example, through an agreement to manage the portfolio company’s funds, such conflicts should be identified and disclosed.

  At the same time, institutions should disclose what actions they are taking to minimize the potentially negative impact on their ability to exercise key ownership rights. Such actions may include the separation of bonuses for fund management from those related to the acquisition of new business elsewhere in the organisation.

  机构投资者在受托人的地位上的行为,应该披露他们如何应对那些具体的利益冲突,而这些冲突可能影响到他们投资的关键所有权的行使。

  中介所有者用他们的股份投票和行使关键的所有权行为时,他们的动机在某些场合可能不同于直接的所有者。这种不同有时可能有商业上的合理性,但也有可能源于利益上的冲突。在受托人机构是一个子公司、或者是另一个金融机构的关联企业、特别是一个完整的金融集团时,这种利益的冲突就表现得非常明显。当这样的冲突产生于实质性的商业关系时,比如,通过一个协议管理证券公司的基金,这种冲突应该被确认和披露。

  同时,机构应该披露他们在行使关键的所有权中采取了那些行动来最大程度地减小潜在的消极影响。这些行为包括,剥离那些给基金管理层的红利与来自组织之外的新的商业收益之间的关系。

  G. Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult with each other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights as defined in the Principles, subject to exceptions to prevent abuse.

  It has long been recognized that in companies with dispersed ownership, individual shareholders might have too small a stake in the company to warrant the cost of taking action or for making an investment in monitoring performance. Moreover, if small shareholders did invest resources in such activities, others would also gain without having contributed (i.e. they are “free riders”). This effect, which serves to lower incentives for monitoring, is probably less of a problem for institutions, particularly financial institutions action in a fiduciary capacity, in deciding whether to increase their ownership to a significant stake in individual companies, or to rather simply diversify. However, other costs with regard to holding a significant stake might still be high. In many instances institutional investors are prevented from doing this because it is beyond their capacity or would require investing more of their assets in one company than may be prudent. To overcome this asymmetry which favours diversification, they should be allowed, and even encouraged, to co-operate and co-ordinate their actions in nominating and electing board members, placing proposals on the agenda and holding discussions directly with a company in order to improve its corporate governance. More generally, shareholders should be allowed to communicate with each other without having to comply with the formalities of proxy solicitation.

  股东、包括机构股东,除了防止滥用之外,应当准许对有关股东的基本权利在诸如本准则中的定义等方面进行相互协商。

  公司所有权的分散化已有很长时间,对于在公司保证采取行动的成本或者在监控作用上所作的投资来讲,单个股东可能只有太小的股份。而且,如果小股东将资源投资于这样的行为上,其他的人没有贡献也将有收益(例如 “搭便车者”free riders)。这种处于较低监控地位的结果,对于机构投资者、尤其处于受托人地位的金融机构的行为上来讲,决定宁可在一个数量十分巨大的股份上对个人公司增加他们的所有权、还是完全多样化投资,这并不是一个很大的问题。然而,持有一个数量十分巨大的股份的其他成本可能仍旧很高。在许多案例中,机构投资者被防止这样做,因为这超过了他们的能力、或可能比谨慎性的要求更多地把他们的资产投资在一个公司里。要克服这种有利于多样化的不对称,他们应该在提名和选择董事会成员、在议程中提出建议、为了促进一个公司的公司治理而保持对一个公司的直接讨论等方面,被准许、甚至被鼓励合作和协调他们的行为。更通常的,股东应该被允许相互交流而不拘泥于代理请求的形式。

  It must be recognized, however, that co-operation among investors could also be used to manipulate markets and to obtain control over a company without being subject to any takeover regulations. Moreover, co-operation might also be for the purposes of circumventing competition law. For this reason, in some countries, the ability of institutional investors to co-operate on their voting strategy is either limited or prohibited. Shareholder agreements may also be closely monitored. However, if co-operation does not involve issues of corporate control, or conflict with concerns about market efficiently and fairness, the benefits of more effective ownership may still be obtained. Necessary disclosure of co-operation among investors, institutional or otherwise, may have to be accompanied by provisions which prevent trading for a period so as to avoid the possibility of market manipulation.

  无论如何必须承认,投资者之间的合作也能够用来操纵市场、并不受任何购并规则制约地获得对某一公司的控制权。而且这种合作也可能用于规避竞争法律的目的。基于这个理由,一些国家对于机构投资者在他们投票策略上的合作能力不是采取限制措施就是完全禁止。股东协议也可以严密监控。然而,如果合作不涉及公司控制问题、或者与公司的市场效益和公平不相抵触,更多有效的所有权收益可以仍旧获取。机构或其他方面的投资者之间的合作公开的必要性,也许只能用有关规定来补充,从而避免操纵市场可能性的产生。

  III. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders股东的公平待遇

  The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.

  Investors’ confidence that the capital they provide will be protected from misuse or misappropriation by corporate managers, board members or controlling shareholders is an important factor in the capital markets. Corporate boards, managers and controlling shareholders may have the opportunity to engage in activities that may advance their own interests at the expense of non-controlling shareholders. In providing protection to investors, a distinction can usefully be made between ex-ante and ex-post shareholder rights. Ex-ante rights are, for example, pre-emptive rights and qualified majorities for certain decisions. Ex-post rights allow the seeking of redress once rights have been violated. In jurisdictions where the enforcement of the legal and regulatory framework is weak, some countries have found it desirable to strengthen the ex-ante rights of shareholders such as by low share ownership thresholds for placing items on the agenda of the shareholders meeting or by requiring supermajority of shareholders for certain important decisions. The Principles support equal treatment for foreign and domestic shareholders in corporate governance. They do not address government policies to regulate foreign direct investment.

  公司治理结构应当保证所有股东的公平待遇,包括少数股东和国外的股东。所有的股东都应该在他们的权利受损时获得有效的补偿的机会。

  投资人对于他们所提供的资金不被公司经理层、董事会成员或控股股东滥用和侵占的信心是资本市场的重要因素。公司董事会、经理层和控股股东有机会从事损害非控股股东的利益而使自己获利的行为。在保护投资者的规定中,一个特征能够有效地区分“事前”和“事后”之间的股东权利。“事前”的权利譬如是先发制人的权利、和对于某些决策的合格多数。“事后”权利在一旦权利被侵害时准许寻求赔偿。在法律和规章制度的执行很弱的地方,一些国家建立了适当强化股东“事前”权利的措施,比如为了在股东大会议程放置条款而降低股份所有权的门槛、或者在某些重要的决策中要求有超过50%股东通过。本准则支持在公司治理中公平对待外国股东和国内股东。但这并不涉及政府如何管理外国直接投资的政策问题。

  股东可执行其权利的途径之一是能够对经营管理层和董事会成员发起法律和行政诉讼程序。经验显示,决定股东权利受保护程度的重要因素,是能否找到一个有效的方法,可以用合理的成本并且避免过多拖延地获得被损害权益的补偿。当少数股东有合理的依据相信他们的权力已经受到侵害,法律制度能够提供给他们提起诉讼的机制,这可以强化中小投资者的信心。提供这样的执行机制是立法者和监管者的关键职责。

  One of the ways in which shareholders can enforce their rights is to be able to initiate legal and administrative proceedings against management and board members. Experience has shown that an important determinant of the degree to which shareholder rights are protected is whether effective methods exist to obtain redress for grievances at a reasonable cost and without excessive delay. The confidence of minority investors is enhanced when the legal system provides mechanisms for minority shareholders to bring lawsuits when they have reasonable grounds to believe that their rights have been violated. The provision of such enforcement mechanism is a key responsibility of legislators and regulators.

  There is some risk that a legal system, which enables any investors to challenge corporate activity in the courts, can become prone to excessive litigation. Thus, many legal systems have introduced provisions to protect management and board members against litigation abuse in the form of tests for the sufficiency of shareholder complaints, so-called safe harbours for management and board member actions (such as the business judgement rule) as well as safe harbours for the disclosure of information. In the end, a balance must be struck between allowing investors to seek remedies for infringement of ownership rights and avoiding excessive litigation. Many countries have found that alternative adjudication procedures, such as administrative hearings or arbitration procedures organized by the securities regulators or other regulatory bodies, are an efficient method for dispute settlement, at least at the first instance level.

  鼓励投资者在法庭质询公司的行为,这样的法律制度存在着一定的风险,也许会造成滥讼。因而许多法律系统引进了保护经营管理层和董事会成员免受滥讼的规定。包括监测股东申诉的充分性、对经营管理层和董事会成员行为(如商业判断规则)的所谓安全港、以及信息披露的安全港等。最终必须在允许投资者对所遭受损害的所有权寻求法律救济与防止滥讼之间求得平衡。许多国家发现,其他可供选择的裁决程序,例如有证券监管机构或其他监管主体举行的行政听证会或仲裁程序是解决争端的有效方法,至少在争议的最初阶段是这样。

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