A. All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally.

　　同一类别、同一系列的股东应当得到同样的公平待遇。

　　1. Within any series of a class, all shares should carry the same rights. All investors should be able to obtain information about the rights attached to all series and classes of shares before they purchase. Any changes in voting rights should be subject to approval by those classes of shares which are negatively affected.

　　The optimal capital structure of the firm is best decided by the management and the board, subject to the approval of the shareholders. Some companies issue preferred (or preference) shares which have a preference in respect of receipt of the profits of the firm but which normally have no voting rights. Companies may also issue participation certificates or shares without voting rights, which would presumably trade may be effective in distributing risk and reward in ways that are thought to be in the best interests of the company and to cost-efficient financing. The Principles do not take a position on the concept of “one share one vote”. However, many institutional investors and shareholders associations support this concept.

　　Investors can expect to be informed regarding their voting rights before they invest. Once they have invested, their rights should not be changed unless those holding voting shares have had the opportunity to participate in the decision. Proposals to change the voting rights of different series and classes of shares should be submitted for approval at general shareholders meetings by a specified majority of voting shares in the affected categories.

　　在同一类别任何系列内，所有的股份都应该具有同样的权利。所有的投资者在他们购买之前都应该获得有关全部类别和系列股份所赋有的权利的信息。在投票权上的任何改变都应该被受到负面影响的股份类别核准。

　　公司最理想的资本结构最好由经营层和董事会决定、并由股东批准。一些公司发行优先股，这些优先股在分配公司利润方面有优先权，但它通常没有投票权。公司也可以发行参与凭证或无投票权股股份，它们与具有投票权的股份交易价格可能不同。所有这些制度在分散风险和分配报酬上是很有效的，而且被认为是符合公司利益和成本效益的最佳筹资方式。本准则对“一股一票”不置立场，然而许多机构投资者和股东协会支持这样的观念。

　　投资者在投资前有权被告知有关投票权的信息。一旦他们投资以后，他们的权力不应该被改变，除非这些持有投票权的股份已经有机会参与了决策。改变不同系列和类别股份投票权的提案应该被提交股东大会、由受到影响部分的投票股份的一个特定多数同意才能通过。

　　2. Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and should have effective means of redress.

　　Many publicly traded companies have a large controlling shareholder. While the presence of a controlling shareholder can reduce the agency problem by closer monitoring of management, weaknesses in the legal and regulatory framework may lead to the abuse of other shareholders in the company. The potential for abuse is marked where the legal system allows, and the market accepts, controlling shareholders to exercise a level of control which does not correspond to the level of risk that they assume as owners through exploiting legal devices to separate ownership from control, such as pyramid structures or multiple voting rights. Such abuse may be carried out in various ways, including the extraction of direct private benefits via high pay and bonuses for employed family members and associates, inappropriate related party transactions, systematic bias in business decisions and changes in the capital structure through special issuance of shares favouring the controlling shareholder.

　　对于控股股东滥用行为造成的利益上的直接或间接伤害，小股东应当受到保护，并且应该有有效的补偿方法。

　　许多公众公司都有一位大的控股股东。虽然控股股东的存在能够通过更密切的管理监控减少代理人问题，但是在法律和监管结构方面的不足可能导致不公正对待公司其他股东。潜在的不公正对待在于，控股股东通过采取合法机制，比如金字塔结构或多重投票权，将所有权和控制权分离，使他们得以行使与他们承担的风险程度不相称的控制力，且被法律允许、被市场接受。这样的不公正对待能通过不同的方法得以解决，包括通过提取直接的个人收益给员工的家庭成员和公司成员以高额报酬和奖金、不相称关联团体的交易、商业决策中有意的偏向和通过特别发行股票促使控股股东改变资本结构等等。

　　In addition to disclosure, a key to protecting minority shareholders is a clearly articulated duty of loyalty by board members to the company and to all shareholders. Indeed, abuse of minority shareholders is most pronounced in those countries where the legal and regulatory framework is weak in this regard. A particular issue arises in some jurisdictions where groups of companies are prevalent and where the duty of loyalty of a board member might be ambiguous and even interpreted as to the group. In these cases, some countries are now moving to control negative effects by specifying that a transaction in favour of another group company must be offset by receiving a corresponding benefit from other companies of the group.

　　Other common provisions to protect minority shareholders, which have proven effective, include pre-emptive rights in relation to share issues, qualified majorities for certain shareholder decisions and the possibility to use circumstances, some jurisdictions require or permit controlling shareholders to buy-out the remaining shareholders at a share-price that is established through an independent appraisal. This is particularly important when controlling shareholders decide to de-list an enterprise. Other means of improving minority shareholder rights include derivative and class action law suits. With the common aim of improving market credibility, the choice and ultimate design of different provisions to protect minority shareholders necessarily depends on the overall regulatory framework and the national legal system.

　　除了公开性，保护小股东的方法还包括董事会成员向公司和所有股东明确忠诚义务。事实上，对小股东的不公正对待主要来自那些在这方面法律和监管结构不完善的国家。在那些集团公司比较流行、董事会成员的忠诚责任模糊不清甚至被曲解成小团体利益的地方，这种问题特别容易发生。在这些案例中，一些国家现在明确规定，有利于其他集团公司的交易必须用获得的相应收益来抵消，并通过这种方法来控制负面效应。

　　其他经常使用并以证明是有效的保护小股东的规定还包括，在有关股票发行问题上的先发制人的权力，对某些股东决策采用有效多数的方式，以及在选举董事会成员时采用累计投票制度。在某些情况下，一些法规要求或允许控股股东以通过独立估价计算得出的股价收购剩余股东的股票。当控股股东决定将一个股份公司改变为除牌独资控股企业的时候，这个举措就特别重要了。其他改善小股东权利的方法包括派生和集团诉讼。为了改善市场信誉的公共目标，选择和最终设计各种条款来保护小股东，必须依赖整体的监管结构和国家法律体系

　　3. Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed upon with the beneficial owner of the shares.

　　In some OECD countries it was customary for financial institutions which held shares in custody for investors to cast the votes of those shares. Custodians such as banks and brokerage firms holding securities as nominees for customers were sometimes required to vote in support of management unless specially instructed by the shareholder to do otherwise.

　　The trend in OECD countries is to remove provisions that automatically enable custodian institutions to cast the votes of shareholders. Rules in some countries have recently been revised to require custodian institutions to provide shareholders with information concerning their options in the use of their voting rights. Shareholders may elect to delegate all voting rights to custodians. Alternatively, shareholders may choose to be informed of all upcoming shareholder votes and may decide to cast some votes while delegating some voting rights t the custodian. It is necessary to draw a reasonable balance between assuring that shareholder votes are not cast by custodians without regard for the wishes of shareholders and not imposing excessive burdens on custodians to secure shareholder approval before casting votes. It is sufficient to disclose to the shareholders that, if no instruction to the contrary is received, the custodian will vote the shares in the way it deems consistent with shareholder interest.

　　It should be noted that this principle does not apply to the exercise of voting rights by trustees or other persons acting under a special legal mandate (such as, for example, bankruptcy receivers and estate executors).

　　Holders of depository receipts should be provided with the same ultimate rights and practical opportunities to participate in corporate governance as are accorded to holders of the underlying shares. Where the direct holders of shares may use proxies, the depositary, trust office or equivalent body should therefore issue on a timely basis to depositary receipt holders. The depository receipt holders should be able to issue binding voting instructions with respect to the shares, which the depositary or trust office holds on their behalf.

　　选举应该在有表决权的股权所有者协商同意的方式上由托管人和代理人投票。

　　在一些OECD国家，那些为投资者保管股份的金融机构通常会以那些股份投票。拥有证券的托管人，如银行和经纪公司，作为代理人，有时候被要求投票支持经营管理层的意愿，除非股东明确表示做其他的选择。

　　OECD国家现在的趋势是，废除那些自动让托管机构为股东投票的条例。一些国家的法规最近已经被修订，它要求托管机构为股东提供关于是否选择使用他们的投票权的信息。股东可以选择将所有的投票权委托给托管人。股东可以选择被告知所有预定投票的股东的表决信息，也可以在将一些投票权委托给托管人的同时自己也决定参与部分投票。保证股东的投票权在未得到其同意的情况下不得由托管人代为投票，以及不至于因为托管人在投票表决前为取得股东核准而增加过多负担，在这两者之间取得平衡是非常必须的。向股东充分说明而没有得到反对的指示，托管人将按照自己所认为的符合股东利益的方式进行投票。

　　我们必须注意，这个原则不适用于托管人或其他特殊法律委任托管的人执行投票权(比如，破产接管人和财产执行人)。

　　存托凭证持有人应该被提供和优先股股东相同的最终权和参与公司治理的实践机会。在直接股票持有人可能使用代理投票权的地方，存托公司、信托机构或相似的其他机构因此应该及时向存托凭证持有人提供代理投票服务。存托凭证持有人应该能够发出与他的股份相等的约束投票指示，使得存托公司、信托机构就像他们自己持有这些权益一样。

　　4. Impediments to cross border voting should be eliminated.

　　Foreign investors often hold their shares through chains of intermediaries. Shares are typically held in accounts with securities intermediaries, that in turn hold accounts with other intermediaries and central securities depositories in other jurisdictions, while the listed company resides in third country. Such cross-border chains cause special challenges with respect to determining the entitlement of foreign investors to use their voting rights, and the process of communicating with such investors. In combination with business practices which provide only a very short notice period, shareholders are often left with only very limited time to react to a convening notice by the company and to make informed decisions concerning items for decision. This makes cross border voting difficult. The legal and regulatory framework should clarify who is entitled to control the voting rights in cross border situations and where necessary to simplify the depository chain. Moreover, notice periods should ensure that foreign investors in effect have similar opportunities to exercise their ownership functions as domestic investors. To further facilitate voting by foreign investors, laws, regulations and corporate practices should allow participation through means which make use of modern technology.

　　对远程投票的妨碍应当被去除。

　　国外投资者常常通过中介的连锁企业持有股份。当上市公司所在地是第三国，典型的做法是股份由有财务关系的证券中介持有，在其他地方也会轮流由其他中介机构和中央证券存托机构所持有。这种远程连锁企业在决定国外投资者的投票权和与这些投资者的交流过程方面遇到了特殊的挑战。由于只提供非常短暂的告知期的商业惯例带来的是，持股人通常也只有非常有限的时间来对公司的召集告知做出反应，并对需要做出决定的事项做出决策。这就使远程投票变得困难。法律和监管制度应该明确谁被授权在这种情况下控制投票权，并且简化存托连锁环节。除此之外，告知期也应该保证国外投资者与国内投资者具有相同的机会来行使他们的所有权。为了让国外投资者更容易地投票，法律、规章和公司惯例应该通过使用现代化技术让他们参与进来。

　　5. Process and procedures for general shareholder meetings should allow for equitable treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures should not make it unduly difficult or expensive to cast votes.

　　The right to participate in general shareholder meetings is a fundamental shareholder right. Management and controlling investors have at times sought to discourage non-controlling or foreign investors from trying to influence the direction of the company. Some companies have charged fees for voting. Other impediments included prohibitions on proxy voting and the requirement of personal attendance at general shareholder meetings to vote. Still other procedures may make it practically impossible to exercise ownership rights. Proxy materials may be sent too close to the time of general shareholder meetings to allow investors adequate time for reflection and consultation. Many companies in OECD countries are seeking to develop better channels of communication and decision-making with shareholders. Efforts by companies to remove artificial barriers to participation in general meetings are encouraged and the corporate governance framework should facilitate the use of electronic voting in absentia.

　　普通股东大会的过程和程序应该对所有股东都公平对待。公司程序不应使得投票过分复杂困难和花费昂贵。

　　参加普通股东大会的权利是股东的基本权利。经营管理层和控股投资者有时会阻碍非控股投资者或外国投资者来影响公司的方向。一些公司要求负担投票费用。其他障碍还包括阻止代理人投票和要求亲自出席普通股东大会投票。还有一些其他程序可能让股东在实际上无法行使投票权。代理人材料可能仅在股东大会之前被发送，以至于投资者没有充足的时间思考和咨询。在OECD国家的许多公司正在寻找发展更好的与股东交流和决策的渠道。鼓励公司去努力消除参加普通股东大会的人为障碍，而且当股东缺席时，公司治理结构应该推动使用电子投票。

　　B. Insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited

　　Abusive self-dealing occurs when persons having close relationships to the company, including controlling shareholders, exploit those relationships to the detriment of the company and investors. As insider trading entails manipulation of the capital markets, it is prohibited by securities regulations, company law and/or criminal law in most OECD countries. However, not all jurisdictions prohibit such practices, and in some cases enforcement is not vigorous. These practices can be seen as constituting a breach of good corporate governance in as much as they violate the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders.

　　The Principles reaffirm that it is reasonable for investors to expect that the abuse of insider power be prohibited. In cases where such abuses are not specifically forbidden by legislation or where enforcement is not effective, it will be important for governments to take measures to remove any such gaps.

　　内部交易和滥用的私利交易应该被禁止。

　　当与公司有密切关系的个人、包括控股股东，利用那些关系来损害公司和投资人的利益时，滥用的私利交易就发生了。当内部交易导致操纵资本市场时，在大多数OECD国家，这种行为被证券规章、公司法和/或刑法严明禁止。然而，不是所有的地方都禁止这种行为，而且在一些情况下，强制也并不是非常有力。这些情况可能造成公司治理的漏洞，因为它们违背了股东的公平待遇原则。

　　本准则重申，投资者对禁止滥用内部权利的期待是合理的。在这种滥用未被立法明确禁止或强制力并不有效的地方，政府采取措施来去除所有这种漏洞就变得尤其重要。

　　C. Members of the board and key executives should be required to disclose to the board whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a material interest in any transaction or matter directly affecting the corporation.

　　Members of the board and key executives have an obligation to inform the board where they have a business, family or other special relationship outside of the company that could affect their judgement with respect to a particular transaction or matter affecting the company. Such special relationships include situations where executives and board members have a relationship with the company via their association with a shareholder who is in a position to exercise control. Where a material interest has been declared, it is good practice for that person not to be involved in any decision involving the transaction or matter.

　　在直接影响到企业的任何交易或事件中，无论董事会成员和关键经营人员直接、间接或在第三方利益上对于董事会具有实质性利益的，都应当被要求公开。

　　当董事会成员和关键经营人员在所从事的商业活动中，他们的家庭成员或公司外其他特殊关系可能影响他们对某项特定交易或影响与公司相关事件的判断的，他们有义务通知董事会。这种特殊的关系包括经营人员和董事会成员通过与有控制权的股东的勾结，与公司产生利害关系。在实质性利益被揭示的情况下，最好的办法就是使那个人排除在这项交易或事件的决策之外。

　　IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance利益相关者的角色

　　The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.

　　A key aspect of corporate governance is concerned with ensuring the flow of external capital to companies both in the form of equity and credit. Corporate governance is also concerned with finding ways to encourage the various stakeholders in the firm to undertake economically optimal levels of investment in firm-specific human and physical capital. The competitiveness and ultimate success of a corporation is the result of teamwork that embodies contributions from a range of different resource providers including investors, employees, creditors, and suppliers. Corporations should recognize that the contributions stakeholders constitute a valuable resource for building competitive and profitable companies. It is, therefore, in the long-term interest of corporation are served by recognizing the interests of stakeholders and their contribution to the long-term success of the corporation.

　　公司治理结构将认可法律和互相协商赋予利益相关者的权利，并且鼓励企业和利益相关者在创造财富、工作机会和持续推动企业财务健康等方面积极合作。

　　公司治理关注的一个关键方面是确保外部资金流以公平和诚信的方式进入公司。公司治理也关注寻找一种方法，以便鼓励公司里的各种利益相关者对企业特有的人力和物质资本担负起经济的最佳投资水平。一个公司的竞争力和最终的成功，来自于包括投资者、员工、债权人和供货商等不同资源提供者的具体贡献的协同努力的结果。对于利益相关者为公司的竞争力和盈利性所组成的有价值的资源，公司应当承认他们的贡献。因此，在利益相关者中鼓励价值创造合作，这是公司的长远利益之所在。治理结构应该认可，公司利益是由承认利益相关者的利益和他们对于公司的长远成功的贡献所构成的。

　　A. The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are to be respected.

　　In all OECD countries, the rights of stakeholders are established by law (e.g. labour, business, commercial and insolvency laws) or by contractual relations. Even in areas where stakeholder interests are not legislated, many firms make additional commitments to stakeholders, and concern over corporate reputation and corporate performance often requires the recognition of broader interests.

　　通过法律和互相协议赋予利益相关者的权利受到尊重。

　　在所有的OECD国家，利益相关者的权利是由法律(例如劳工法、商法、贸易法和破产法)或者契约关系所确定的。甚至在利益相关者的利益没有被立法的地区，许多公司也对利益相关者制定了附加的约定，并且，关注公司的声誉和业绩常常要求对于广泛利益的重视。

　　B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.

　　The legal framework and process should be transparent and not impede ability of stakeholders to communicate and to obtain redress for the violation of rights.

　　利益相关者的利益受到法律的保护，在他们的权利受到损害时应当获得有效补偿的机会。

　　法律框架和程序应当是透明的、并不能对利益相关者在权利受损时沟通能力和获得补偿能力的作用产生阻碍。

　　C. Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop.

　　The degree to which employees participate in corporate governance depends on national laws and practices, and may vary from company to company as well. In the context of corporate governance, performance enhancing mechanisms for participation may benefit companies directly as well as indirectly through the readiness by employees to invest in firm specific skills. Examples of mechanisms for employee participation include: employee representation on boards; and governance processes such as works councils that consider employee viewpoints in certain key decision. With respect to performance enhancing mechanisms, employee stock ownership plans or other profit sharing mechanisms are to be found in many countries. Pension commitments are also often an element of the relationship between the company and its past and present employees. Where such commitments involve establishing an independent fund, its trustees should be independent of the company’s management and manage the fund for all beneficiaries.

　　提高员工参与程度的机制应当被允许发展。

　　在公司治理中员工的参与程度，依赖于国家的法律和实际状况，并且可能在公司和公司之间也有所不同。在公司治理的环境中，提高参与程度的机制使得员工掌握公司特殊技能的途径更简化便捷，从而使公司直接和间接地得益。员工参与机制的例子包括：在董事会中的员工代表，以及在某些关键决策中考虑到员工观点的、像劳工理事会那样的治理程序。至于提高参与性的机制，员工持股计划、或其他利润分享机制在许多国家被建立。养老金投入对于公司与过去及现在的员工之间的关系来说也是一个基本要素。这类投入包括建立一个独立的基金，它的托管人应该独立于公司的经营管理层、并为所有的受益人管理基金。

　　D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis.

　　Where laws and practice of corporate governance systems provide for participation by stakeholders, it is important that stakeholders have access to information necessary to fulfil their responsibilities.

　　在公司治理过程中利益相关者参与的地方，在及时和有规则的基础上，他们应该有渠道获得恰当的、充分的、可靠的信息。

　　在公司治理系统的法律和实践中提供给利益相关者参与的地方，利益相关者是否具有履行它们责任的必需的信息渠道，这是十分重要的。

　　E. Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board and their rights should not be compromised for doing this.

　　Unethical and illegal practices by corporate officers may not only violate the rights of stakeholders but also be to the detriment of the company and its shareholders in terms of reputation effects and an increasing risk of future financial liabilities. It is therefore to the advantage of the company and its shareholders to establish procedures and safe-harbours for complaints by employees, either personally or through their representative bodies, and others outside the company, concerning illegal and unethical behaviour. In many countries the board is being encouraged by laws and or principles to protect these individuals and representative bodies and to give them confidential direct access to someone independent on the board, often a member of an audit or an ethics committee. Some companies have established an ombudsman to deal with complaints. Several regulators have also established confidential phone and e-mail facilities to receive allegations. While in certain countries representative employee bodies undertake the tasks of conveying concerns to the company, individual employees should not be precluded from, or be less protected, when acting alone. When there is an inadequate response to a complaint regarding contravention of the law, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises encourage them to report their bona fide complaint to the competent public authorities. The company should refrain from discriminatory or disciplinary actions against such employees or bodies.

　　利益相关者，包括个别员工和他们的代表，应该能够自由地交换他们关于对董事会违法和不道德行为的看法，在做这些时他们的权利不应受到损害。

　　公司官员的不道德和违法行为可能不仅侵害了利益相关者的权利、而且也在财产信誉期限和增加未来金融责任风险上对公司和他的股东造成了损害。相对于因违法和不道德行为而被员工亲自或者他们的代表、被公司外部的其他人起诉，公司和他们的股东建立一套程序和安全措施将是有利的。在许多国家，董事会被法律或其他准则鼓励，保护这些员工个人和他们的代表人;并常常赋予一个审计成员、或者是一个道德委员会建立独立于董事会的秘密的直接渠道。针对带有投诉的交易，一些公司设立了一个调查公司官员舞弊的职务。作为某种调节手段，也设立了保密电话和电子邮件设施来接收辩解。而在一些国家，当员工代表承担了向公司转递信息的任务时，个别员工应当不被排除在外，或者在单独行动时应得到充分保护。当一个违反法律的申诉得到了不适当的反应时，OECD《跨国企业指引》鼓励他们将 “善意”申诉提交给胜任的公共管理机构。公司应该杜绝针对这些员工和代表的歧视和惩戒行为。

　　(6)公司治理结构应当被一个有效的破产机制和债权实施机制所补充。

　　F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective, efficient insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor rights.

　　Especially in emerging markets, creditors are a key stakeholder and the terms, volume and type of credit extended to firms will depend importantly on their rights and on their enforceability. Companies with a good corporate governance record are often able to borrow larger sums and on more favourable terms than those with poor records or which operate in non-transparent markets. The framework for corporate insolvency varies widely across countries. In some countries, when companies are nearing insolvency, the legislative framework imposes a duty on directors to act in the interests of creditors, who might therefore play a prominent role in the governance of the company. Other countries have mechanisms which encourage the debtor to reveal timely information about the company’s difficulties so that a consensual solution can be found between the debtor and its creditors.

　　Creditors’ rights vary, ranging from secured bond holders to unsecured creditors. Insolvency procedures usually require efficient mechanisms for reconciling the interests of different classes of creditors. In many jurisdictions provision is made for special rights such as through “debtor in possession” financing which provides incentives/protection for new funds made available to the enterprise in bankruptcy.

　　特别是在市场化过程中，债权人是利益相关者的关键，公司将主要依靠他们的权利和法律的可执行性来提升自己信用的期限、数量和形式。具有良好公司治理纪录的公司，经常能够比那些有不良记录的、带有不透明市场运作的企业借到更多数量和更优惠期限的资金。公司破产制度在不同国家有广泛的变化。在一些国家，当公司接近于破产时，法律制度通过对董事的征税来保护债权人的利益，使之在公司的治理中扮演突出的角色。在其他国家有这样的机制，督促债务人及时披露有关公司困难的信息，以便债务人和债权人双方能够找到都能接受的解决办法。

　　债权人的权利常在安全的合同持有者和不安全的债权人之间改变。破产程序通常需要有效的机制，来调解不同类别的债权人的利益。在许多司法规定中，制定了特别的权利，像通过用激励/保护方式对“债务人财产”进行金融运作，使企业破产时新的赔偿基金的建立成为可能。

　　V. Disclosure and Transparency信息披露和透明度

　　The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company.

　　In most OECD countries a large amount of information, both mandatory and voluntary, is compiled on publicly traded and large unlisted enterprises, and subsequently disseminated to a broad range of users. Public disclosure is typically required, at a minimum, on an annual basis though some countries require periodic disclosure on a semi-annual or quarterly basis, or even more frequently in the case of material developments affecting the company. Companies often make voluntary disclosure that goes beyond minimum disclosure requirements in response to market demand.

　　A strong disclosure regime that promotes real transparency is a pivotal feature of market-based monitoring of companies and is central to shareholders’ ability to exercise their ownership rights on an informed basis. Experience in countries with large and active equity markets shows that disclosure can also be a powerful tool for influencing the behaviour of companies and for protecting investors. A strong disclosure regime can help to attract capital and maintain confidence in the capital markets. By contrast, weak disclosure and non-transparent practices can contribute to unethical behaviour and to a loss of market integrity at great cost, not just to the company and its shareholders but also to the economy as a whole. Shareholders and potential investors require access to regular, reliable and comparable information in sufficient detail for them to assess the stewardship of management, and make informed decisions about the valuation, ownership and voting of shares. Insufficient or unclear information may hamper the ability of the markets to function, increase the cost of capital and result in a poor allocation of resources.

　　Disclosure also helps improve public understanding of the structure and activities of enterprises, corporate policies and performance with respect to environmental and ethical standards, and companies’ relationships with the communities in which they operate. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are relevant in this context.

　　Disclosure requirements are not expected to place unreasonable administrative or cost burdens on enterprises. Nor are companies expected to disclose information that may endanger their competitive position unless disclosure is necessary to fully inform the investment decision and to avoid misleading the investor. In order to determine what information should be disclosed at a minimum, many countries apply the concept of materiality. Material information can be defined as information whose omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions taken by users of information.

　　The Principles support timely disclosure of all material developments that arise between regular reports. They also support simultaneous reporting of information to all shareholders in order to ensure their equitable treatment. In maintaining close relations with investors and market participants, companies must be careful not to violate this fundamental principle of equitable treatment.

　　公司治理结构应该保证公司所有重大事件及时地、准确地得到披露，包括财务状况、业绩、所有权和公司治理的情况。

　　在大部分OECD成员国，大量强制和自愿披露的信息都是在上市公司及大型未上市公司中汇集和编撰的，这些信息随后散布到广大的信息使用者手中。国际上一般规定公司至少每年度公开披露信息，还有一些国家规定公司每半年或每季度披露信息，甚至在一些事件的出现影响到企业的重大发展时，要求更频繁的信息披露。企业经常自愿披露比最低披露标准更丰富的信息以回应市场的需求。

　　一个强有力的、能促进真正信息透明化的信息披露体制是以市场为基础的公司监管体系的重要特征，它对股东能在知情基础上行使所有权至关重要。来自一些拥有大规模的、活跃的证券市场的国家的经验表明，信息披露可以成为影响公司行为和保护投资者的有效工具。强有力的信息披露体制可以在资本市场中吸引资金并保持投资者的信心。与之相反的，无效的披露体制以及不透明的操作惯例将可能导致缺乏职业道德的行为，并可能给整个市场带来巨大损失，这种损失不仅针对某个公司和它的股东，而且将影响整个经济。股东和潜在投资者需要规范、可靠、可比较的完备的信息，从而了解公司的经营管理情况，然后在此基础上就估值定价、所有权、选举权等问题做出决策。不完备或不明确的信息可能阻碍市场的运行，增加资本成本，并可能导致资源的无效配置。

　　信息披露还能帮助增强公众对企业结构和行为、对关乎环境和道德标准的公司政策，以及对公司及其相关团体间的关系的理解。OECD《跨国企业指引》就与此相关。

　　对信息披露的要求并不会给企业带来管理负担或增加成本，企业也不会被要求披露那些危及企业竞争地位的信息，除非这种披露对提供全面的投资决策的信息是必须的、或披露这些信息可以避免对投资者的误导。在判断哪些信息必须披露的问题上，许多国家都采用了重要性的概念。具有重要性的信息可以定义为那些如果遗漏或误陈则可能影响信息使用者的经济决策的信息。

　　本准则要求企业及时披露发生在定期报告之间的重要事项发展。本准则还要求同时对所有股东发布信息，以确保股东受到平等对待。企业在保持与投资者和市场参与者密切关系的同时，必须不能违背平等对待的基本原则。

　　A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on:

　　披露将包括、但不限制于以下重要信息：

　　1. The financial and operating results of the company. 公司财务和业绩状况;

　　Audited financial statements showing the financial performance and the financial situation of the company (most typically including the balance sheet, the profit and loss statement, the cash flow statement and notes to the financial statements) are the most widely used source of information on companies. In their current form, the two principal goals of financial statements are to enable appropriate monitoring to take place and to provide the basis to value securities. Management’s discussion and analysis of operation is typically included in annual reports. This discussion is most useful when read in conjunction with the accompanying financial statements. Investors are particularly interested in information that may shed light on the future performance of the enterprise.

　　Arguably, failures of governance can often be linked to the failure to disclose the “whole picture”, particularly where off-balance sheet items are used to provide guarantees or similar commitments between related companies. It is therefore important that transactions relating to an entire group of companies be disclosed in line with high quality internationally recognized standards and include information about contingent liabilities and off-balance sheet transactions, as well as special purpose entities.

　　审计后的财务报表(一般包括资产负债表、损益表、现金流量表以及财务报表注释)显示了公司的财务业绩和财务状况，是最为广泛使用的企业信息来源。就现行的财务报表形式，应用财务报表有两个主要的目标：一是使开展合理的监管成为可能，二是提供证券估价的基础。经营管理层对公司运营情况的讨论和分析通常在年报中予以叙述，如果结合相应的财务报表对此进行分析阅读，这些信息十分有用。投资者尤其对那些可能预示公司前景的信息感兴趣。

　　事实表明，公司治理的失败通常与披露的信息未能展示企业全貌有关，尤其是在用资产负债表外的项目为关联企业提供担保或类似的委托事项的情况。因此在高质量的国际标准下对与整个集团公司相关的交易情况予以披露十分重要，其中包括披露或有负债、表外交易、特殊利益实体的信息。

　　2. Company objectives公司经营目标;

　　In addition to their commercial objectives, companies are encouraged to disclose policies relating to business ethics, the environment and other public policy commitments. Such information may be important for investors and other users of information to better evaluate the relationship between companies and the communities in which they operate and the steps that companies have taken to implement their objectives.

　　除公司的商业目标以外，公司还被鼓励披露与商业道德、环境及其他与公众责任相关的政策。这些信息可能使投资者和其它信息使用者更好的评价公司在为实现经营目标所做的努力中与其所在的社会之间的关系。

　　3. Major share ownership and voting rights主要股权和投票权;

　　One of the basic rights of investors is to be informed about the ownership structure of the enterprise and their rights vis-à-vis the rights of other owners. The right to such information should also extend to information about the structure of a group of companies and intra-group relations. Such disclosures should make transparent the objectives, nature and structure of the group. Countries often require disclosure of ownership data once certain thresholds of ownership are passed. Such disclosure might include data on major shareholders and others that, directly or indirectly, control or may control the company through special voting rights, shareholder agreements, the ownership of controlling or large blocks of shares, significant cross shareholding relationships and cross guarantees.

　　Particularly for enforcement purposes, and to identify potential conflicts of interest, related party transactions and insider trading, information about beneficial ownership. In cases where major shareholdings are held through intermediary structures or arrangements, information about the beneficial owners should therefore be obtainable at least by regulatory and enforcement agencies and/or through the judicial process. The OECD template Options for Obtaining Beneficial Ownership and Control Information can serve as a useful self-assessment tool for countries that wish to ensure necessary access to information about beneficial ownership.

　　投资者的一项基本权利是了解公司的所有权结构和他们与其他股权所有者权利的相对关系。这项知情权可以扩展到对一个集团公司结构以及集团内部关系的了解。这些信息的披露可以保证集团的经营目标、性质和结构透明公开。国家通常规定在某些所有权变更时披露所有权信息，包括披露主要股东及其它对公司有控制力、或可能通过特别投票权、股东协议、持有大量股权、具有重大交叉持股关系或交叉担保等方式直接或间接控制公司的股东。

　　为确保投资者的上述权利，并为发现潜在的利益冲突及相关的关联交易和内部交易，历史股权记录必须包含由于股权变更而受益的股权所有者的信息。对于主要股权由中介机构持有的情况，有关受益的股权所有者的信息应该至少可以通过制定规章的机构或执行机构、或通过评判裁决过程获取。对于希望获得受益股权所有者的信息的国家来说， OECD的格式样本《获得有利的所有权及控制信息的选择性》是它们进行自我评价的有效工具。

　　4. Remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives, and information about board members, including their qualifications, the selection process, other company directorships and whether they are regarded as independent by the board.

　　Investors require information on individual board members and key executives in order to evaluate their experience and qualifications and assess any potential conflicts of interest that might affect their judgement. For board members, the information should include their qualifications, share ownership in the company, membership of other boards and whether they are considered by the board to be an independent member. It is important to disclose membership of other boards not only because it is an indication of experience and possible time pressures facing a member of the board, but also because it may reveal potential conflicts of interest and makes transparent the degree to which there are inter-locking boards.

　　A number of national principles, and in some cases laws, lay down specific duties for board members who can be regarded as independent and in some instances recommend that a majority of the board should be independent. In many countries, it is incumbent on the board to set out the reasons why a member of the board can be considered independent. It is then up to the shareholders, and ultimately the market, to determine if those reasons are justified. Several countries have concluded that companies should disclose the selection process and especially whether it was open to a broad field of candidates. Such information should be provided in advance of any decision by the general shareholder’s meeting or on a continuing basis if the situation has changed materially.

　　Information about board and executive remuneration is also of concern to shareholders. Of particular interest is the link between remuneration and company performance. Companies are generally expected to disclose information on the remuneration of board members and key executives so that investors can assess the costs and benefits of remuneration plans and the contribution of incentive schemes, such as stock option schemes, to company performance. Disclosure on an individual basis (including termination and retirement provisions) is increasingly regarded as good practice and is now mandated in several countries. In these cases, some jurisdictions call for remuneration of a certain number of the highest paid executives to be disclosed, while in others it is confined to specified positions.

　　对董事会成员和关键经营人员的薪酬政策，和董事会成员的信息，包括他们的资格、选择程序、在其他公司兼任董事情况以及他们是否被董事会确认为独立董事;

　　投资者需要了解董事会成员和主要经营人员的情况，来评估他们的经验、资格并判断他们之间是否存在潜在的可能影响判断力的利益冲突。对于董事会成员来说,还应披露他们的资格、在公司的股份、是否兼任其他公司董事以及公司是否确认他们是独立董事。披露是否兼任其他公司董事是非常重要的，它不仅表明了该董事会成员经验资历和其安排时间时可能受到的限制，同时也显示了潜在的利益冲突，以及在何种程度上各公司的董事会间存在关联。

　　一些国家的准则、甚至一些法律，规定独立董事承担特别的义务，还有准则鼓励大多数的董事会成员都是独立董事。在许多国家，董事会负有义务陈述其某位成员可以视为独立董事的原因，由股东、最终是市场，来判定这些理由是否合理。有些国家认为公司应该披露选举过程，尤其是这一过程是否面向范围广大的候选者。这些信息必须在股东大会做出任何决定之前予以披露，当情况有重要变化时应该追踪披露。

　　董事会成员和经营人员的报酬也是股东关心的问题，尤其受到关注的是他们的报酬和公司业绩之间的联系。公司一般会披露董事会成员和主要经营人员的薪酬信息，这样投资者可以评判薪酬计划的成本收益性以及激励政策，比如期权计划、业绩评估。个人情况的披露(包括合约期满和退休的规定)正逐渐为公司应用，目前某些国家已对此做出强制性规定。其中有些要求披露最高级别薪酬的经营人员的报酬，另一些则要求披露一些特定职位的报酬。

　　5. Related party transactions关联交易;

　　It is important for the market to know whether the company is being run with due regard to the interests of all its investors. To this end, it is essential for the company to fully disclose material related party transactions to the market, either individually, or on a grouped basis, including whether they have been executed at arms-length and on normal market terms. In a number of jurisdictions this is indeed already a legal requirement. Related parties can include entities that control or are under common control with the company, significant shareholders including members of their families and key management personnel.

　　Transactions involving the major shareholders (or their close family, relations etc.), either directly or indirectly, are potentially the most difficult type of transactions. In some jurisdictions, shareholders above a limit as low as 5 per cent shareholding are obliged to report transactions. Disclosure requirements include the nature of the relationship where control exists and the nature and amount of transactions with related parties, grouped as appropriate. Given the inherent opaqueness of many transactions, the obligation may need to be placed on the beneficiary to inform the board about the transaction, which in turn should make a disclosure to the market. This should not absolve the firm from maintaining its own monitoring, which is an important task for the board.

　　对于市场来说，了解公司在经营过程中是否平等对待所有股东的利益很重要。为此公司必须向市场全面披露所有个人性质或集团性质的关联交易，包括这些交易是以内部价格成交还是以一般市场价格为基础。一些地方甚至将此列为法律规定。关联方包括对公司达到控制或共同控制的实体、重要股东及其家庭成员以及主要管理人员。

　　涉及主要股东(或其密切的家庭成员)的交易，无论是直接交易还是间接交易，是最难处理的交易类型。一些地方要求持股5%及其以上的股东有义务披露其交易。披露的信息内容应该包括控制关系的性质，关联交易及类似交易的性质和规模。由于许多交易的不透明性，可能需要交易的受益方向董事会通告交易，再由董事会向市场披露。董事会的一项重要任务是防止企业躲避自我监督。